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Humanity lives and operates simultaneously in three spaces critical to 
contemporary life and governance: public, transactional and ecological. 
Failures in one space can cascade into others. Managing them so as to avoid 
such failures is an essential function of global governance. 
Public space is the home of governance (formal and informal) and of 
rights-exercising groups and individuals enjoying areas maintained for 
common use. Civil society fully exercising its basic human rights is essential 
to a well-functioning state, and well-functioning states are critical support-
ing elements in the present architecture of global governance. Wherever 
states are fragile or torn by conflict, they become fracture points in that archi-
tecture. Transactional space – the realm of trade, finance, and other markets 
and networks, especially digital – has experienced explosive growth in the 
last two decades. The new global economy is marked by openness and low 
costs of communication and transport but also greater vulnerability to, and 
opportunity for, transnational crime. Both of these spaces depend, in turn, 
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on ecological space, the planet-wide system of systems that influence one 
another and set the background conditions for human life and civilisation.   
In none of these spaces are current tools and institutions of global gov-
ernance up to the challenges they face. Mass violence in fragile states, 
cross-border economic shocks and cyber attacks, and the threat of runaway 
climate change threaten the public, transactional and ecological spaces of 
human existence. Getting global-governance reform right, however, will 
require paying close attention to the provision not just of security, but also 
of justice – and seeing to it that the two are mutually reinforcing.
Just security
Whereas security has always been considered integral to global gover-
nance, and to the mission of the United Nations, global justice has not been 
accorded similar central importance. Yet of the four main aims identified in 
the preamble to the 1945 UN Charter, only one – ‘to save succeeding genera-
tions from the scourge of war’ – is primarily security-focused. The preamble 
makes it clear that keeping war at bay is a means to other, even greater ends: 
human rights and dignity, gender equality, social and economic progress, 
liberty and justice. 
Before the UN Charter, the pursuit of security was enshrined in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, and, before that, at least in one part of 
the world, in the Concert of Europe. The notion of justice emerged more 
resolutely in deliberations at the global level with the charter, a result of the 
insight that to truly defeat the scourge of war, collective or common security 
alone is not enough. Unless both security and justice are guaranteed – 
reflecting humanity’s yearning not only to survive but to thrive with dignity 
– neither security nor justice is sustainable over the medium to long term. 
Security is merely the appearance of order, in a framework of structural 
violence, unless it is tempered or leavened by concepts of justice that include 
human rights, human dignity and other normative limits on the use of 
power. The pursuit of justice, in turn, is crippled if it is not backed up by the 
requisite means to maintain order. The intersection between security and 
justice, or ‘just security’, is an essential element of any global-governance 
enterprise or architecture.1 
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Security enhances justice by creating stable conditions – social, economic 
and political – for justice to take root and flourish; bringing greater urgency 
to justice goals, by stressing close links with immediate security concerns; 
and helping make advances in justice irreversible. Justice reinforces secu-
rity by addressing many of the root causes of insecurity at different levels 
of governance (such as inequality, lack of transparency, corruption and 
authoritarianism);2 balancing the short-termism of many security impera-
tives with the medium- to long-term considerations of justice; and helping 
to expand the constituency for security promotion to a broader range of 
public- and private-sector actors.   
Of course, security and justice also differ in several ways. Security pro-
motion tends to be a status-quo-oriented endeavour, although the status 
quo a security institution aims to defend post-conflict and post-reform may 
be different than that which its predecessor institutions promoted. Once set 
in motion, however, security promotion tends to have considerable institu-
tional momentum and affinity for functional stability. Institutions of justice 
can also be highly conservative – procedurally and politically – but justice 
promotion itself is more often viewed, at least by its supporters, as pro-
gressive and potentially transformational. It is therefore often contentious, 
and may be seen as a threat to social elites. Security-sector reform and post-
conflict peacebuilding can be seen as ways to make security and stability 
supportive of transformational aspects of justice. 
Global-security imperatives (such as prosecuting the ‘global war on 
terror’ and removing the threat of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons) 
can undermine the promotion of justice at the local level – for example, when 
civilians are affected directly by economic sanctions and military actions. 
Justice and security are rarely considered equal in any given situation, such 
as when force protection takes precedence over building rule-of-law insti-
tutions because it is less risky for the intervening external actors. In cases 
where short-term trade-offs favour security and the promotion of stability, 
the goal should be to return to balance as quickly as possible, with justice 
– as embodied in military law codes, International Humanitarian Law, 
International Human Rights Law, and mission rules of engagement – posi-
tioned to serve as a constant governor of security and stabilisation actions.
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Emerging global-governance actors
As the United Nations enters its eighth decade, the world is less Westphalian 
than ever. Indeed, it is more appropriate to speak not of one, but of at least 
three United Nations, consisting of the member states, the secretariat and 
UN bureaucracy, and independent, yet UN-affiliated, civil-society organisa-
tions.3 These and other actors are assuming an increasingly prominent role 
within the wider global-governance architecture. They can serve both as 
contributors to and as detractors from security and justice.4 
Firstly, international and regional intergovernmental organisations, 
both within and outside the UN system, feature prominently in global 
governance. Many regional and sub-regional organisations, such as the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union 
(AU), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the European 
Union (EU), are increasingly developing a global outlook and serve as 
partners to global multilateral efforts, including peace operations. For 
instance, the EU fights piracy off the coast of Somalia, ASEAN has become 
the driver of building a wider, ASEAN–Pacific governance architecture, 
and the AU undertakes ‘hybrid’ peace missions in cooperation with the 
UN.
Secondly, local authorities, cities and other sub-state actors, some of 
which are formally part of government, claim considerable powers in their 
jurisdictions, but they can also make distinctive contributions to global gov-
ernance. Regions, municipalities, and mega- or global cities are increasingly 
regarded as new structures of decentralised decision-making that fit the 
speed and changing nature of the global economy. The world’s 750 largest 
cities already account for 57% of global GDP. Local communities, for their 
part, are the first responders for climate-change adaptation or rebuilding 
efforts after conflict.5
Thirdly, civil society is represented by more than 4,000 non-governmental 
organisations at the UN’s Economic and Social Council, as well as by many 
other prominent organisations worldwide – such as Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International and Greenpeace. Global philanthropy, moreover, 
wields staggering amounts of wealth, in many cases surpassing official 
development assistance (ODA) from countries such as the Netherlands, the 
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United Arab Emirates and Canada, which are among the top-ten state ODA 
contributors.6
Fourthly, the role of the business sector in global governance has long 
been acknowledged, and continues to grow. This sector includes multina-
tionals: powerful, globally operating entities. The 2,000 largest companies in 
2014 accounted for $38 trillion in revenues and employed 90 million people 
worldwide.7 This category also encompasses international media organisa-
tions and local entrepreneurs as important drivers of post-conflict recovery, 
as well as adapters to new technologies on the ground.
These developments notwithstanding, premature declarations of the 
demise of the state as a relevant entity in global governance should be 
resisted. Global governance by a plethora of diverse 
actors is not anarchy, but a world state as the singu-
lar provider of justice and security is not imminent, 
nor is any benevolent unipolar moment. The state 
remains the primary addressee of obligations under 
international law and other global norms. In partic-
ular, it remains the primary provider of justice and 
security to its citizens and within its territory. 
Concepts such as the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P), the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
acknowledge, rather than refute, the continuing pre-eminent role of the 
state. An important part of R2P is affirming that the state remains primarily 
responsible for keeping its citizens safe. Despite (or because of) the growing 
power of the private sector, especially multinational corporations, states are 
called upon to ensure the protection of human rights on their territory. The 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, via the principle of complemen-
tarity enshrined in Articles 1 and 17, similarly stresses the state’s primary 
responsibility for bringing perpetrators of atrocities to justice. Yet each of 
these key norms and documents make clear that where states fail to deliver, 
other levels and actors of governance need to step in. Hence, although states 
may continue to be seen as primarily responsible, they are not the only, 
nor necessarily the most suited, providers of justice and security; they may 
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find themselves in need of assistance regarding the most serious threats and 
challenges in global governance.
The roles of international organisations and, in particular, subnational 
levels of government and a wide variety of commercial and civil-society 
actors, have long been recognised as critical to humanitarian and disaster 
relief and post-conflict reconstruction. More recently, the contributions of 
non-state actors in grappling with the challenges of climate change have 
been recognised as critical, for instance in the 2013 Lima–Paris Action 
Agenda.8 Governance of the internet, similarly, has always been a multi-
stakeholder, multilevel enterprise with governments as collaborators, but 
not controlling partners, of a global network that is 90% privately owned.
State fragility and political violence
The problems of fragile states and their ‘ungoverned’ spaces (that is, areas 
under the control of private militias, terrorist groups or no one in particu-
lar) are not just domestic.9 They tend to cascade disorder into neighbouring 
states. They can be used as transit zones by drug or human traffickers and 
are prone to having their resources looted for international markets. 
The World Bank Institute calculates that more than 1.5 billion people 
live in countries affected by fragility and conflict, and more than half of 
those people live in poverty, compared with 22% for all low-income coun-
tries taken together. Conflict-affected states are some of the least developed 
in the world.10 
Since 2005, states have agreed in principle that they have a responsibility 
– inherent in the laws and norms that guide state behaviour, and in recogni-
tion of the dignity of the individual person – to prevent genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity within their borders, and that 
other states have a responsibility to extend protection against such crimes 
should a government fail to exercise that responsibility or itself become a 
perpetrator. These principles are consistent with sovereignty being under-
stood more in terms of the responsibility of public authority toward those 
under its control than as the unbridled prerogative of those wielding power. 
The corollaries of R2P are responsibilities to prevent and to rebuild. With 
regard to prevention and peacemaking, it is vitally important that states 
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and institutions make greater efforts to bring women into conflict media-
tion, peace negotiations and processes of peace implementation, as they are 
better placed to address women’s differential experiences of conflict and 
their concerns for and interests in rebuilding sustainable peace.  
Over the past two decades, the United Nations, NATO, the European 
Union, the African Union and other regional organisations have undertaken 
peacekeeping and stabilisation operations (the latter where peace must be 
created and then kept). Most peacekeepers have deployed under the UN 
flag. In the vast majority of new operations over the past quarter-century, 
UN forces have faced one or more armed groups either not a party to major 
peace accords or otherwise inclined to use force against the UN. The need 
to keep upwards of 90,000 troops and 13,000 police in the field in eight 
complex operations for years at a time – rotating and replacing contingents 
on a regular basis every six to 12 months and coping with increasingly dan-
gerous operating environments – has placed the UN’s peacekeeping system 
under extraordinary stress. The comparable peak period in the 1990s lasted 
less than three years, as did the average complex operation.11
Today’s operations are more likely to last seven to ten years in equally 
unstable environments.12 Nor is it clear that demand has peaked. Thus far, 
no complex peacekeeping operation has ever deployed in the Middle East 
or North Africa (we count the seven-year US presence in Iraq as occupa-
tion and counter-insurgency, rather than peacekeeping). Yet Libya could 
hardly be worse off than it is today, riven and politically adrift, if interna-
tional forces had been present from the start of NATO’s operations there to 
provide impartial on-the-ground security and to encourage regional militias 
to return home and disband. Nor, given the tidal wave of refugees presently 
crashing against European shores, is it clear that denial of all but palliative 
care in regards to the Syrian civil war has brought about better results in 
terms of either security or justice than more resolute external support to 
forces opposing a regime clearly in egregious breach of its R2P obligations, 
or at least much greater pressure on the regime itself. 
Meanwhile, the United States and its European allies are weary of 
foreign interventions, after almost a decade of war in Iraq, and longer still 
in Afghanistan. But in the case of closer-by conflicts, what you do not care 
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to visit will eventually visit you. And they will use GPS-enabled phones and 
downloadable maps to do so, after involuntarily contributing substantial 
amounts to the growing wealth of organised criminal traffickers, and losing 
family members in the process. The absence of positive support to peace – 
preventive or corrective – means greater leeway for the forces of disorder. 
To improve UN capacity to deploy well-trained troops and police in 
peace operations, the report of the Commission on Global Security, Justice 
& Governance, ‘Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance’, recom-
mended earmarking select member-state military units and formed police 
units for UN service on a rolling basis; doubling UN military-planning 
capacity; expanding the UN’s standing capacity to deploy individual police 
officers and civilian experts by a factor of ten; and establishing a police and 
civilian reserve capacity able to staff up the management capacity of new 
operations in a matter of weeks rather than months.13 But the interests of 
the global community, neighbouring states and the country confronting its 
own crisis of governance could be better met were the international and 
regional community also better able to effect conflict-prevention measures, 
which means developing better early warning and understanding of con-
flict drivers. Post-conflict, the same pool of knowledge could contribute to 
rebuilding and, with luck, transforming the underlying causes of conflict to 
support sustainable peace. 
War-torn societies need more than one kind of post-conflict justice. They 
need legal or retributive justice, acknowledgement of wrongdoing, socio- 
economic justice (in the form of compensation for injury or loss) and politi-
cal justice (meaning democratic accountability, as well as public policy 
and services).14 Peacebuilders should also be especially sensitive to the fact 
that building government legitimacy in the eyes of society requires anti-
corruption strategies built into capacity-building programmes, giving equal 
emphasis to personal and institutional integrity and ways to incentivise it. 
Reducing corruption is essential to building effective rule of law.  
Global financial and economic volatility
When the 2008 financial crisis in the United States rippled quickly through 
the international financial system, the damage felt by many regional and 
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national economies heightened a sense of both insecurity and injustice. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated global bank losses due to the 
financial crisis as exceeding $4trn,15 contributing to a prolonged economic 
crisis in Europe that subsequently triggered political and constitutional 
crises. Meanwhile, in developing countries, falling prices and export 
demand, accompanied by reversals of capital flows and reductions in remit-
tances, have resulted in declining output and employment.16 These shocks 
to the global economic system have threatened the very fabric of national 
economies, the often delicate social contract between governments and their 
citizens, and the personal and material security of individual citizens.
As the public discourse on Greece and the eurozone, and Thomas 
Piketty’s popular work Capital in the Twenty-First Century on wealth distri-
bution, both show, considerations of economic insecurity can quickly spill 
over into concern for key principles of justice, such as fairness, inequality 
and participation in governance.17 The International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) estimated that the global number of unemployed in 2009 was about 
34m higher than in 2007.18 By 2013, the global economy was still falling 
about 4m jobs short of keeping pace with the growth in the labour force.19 
Economic crises and inequality have worldwide spillover effects, as young 
people continue to face grim employment prospects. This has implications 
both for the scale of economic migration and for the potential attractiveness 
of extremist narratives offering place and purpose, however destructive, to 
those unable to find constructive alternatives.20  
The risks of another global financial meltdown – amplified by poorly 
regulated markets for securities and currencies, as well as diverging inter-
est rates and monetary policies in major economies – remains high.21 The 
2008–09 crisis might not have triggered new trade and currency wars, but 
is today’s global-governance architecture prepared to prevent future such 
scenarios? With the aim of adopting a just-security approach to managing 
global financial volatility and responding to future global economic shocks, 
new frameworks for global economic cooperation and crisis response 
should be developed, anchored by a reinforced G20. 
The G20 possesses several strengths, including the fact that it meets at 
the highest political level (at the Leaders Forum) since late 2008, and has a 
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diverse, yet manageable number of members, accounting for two-thirds of 
the world’s population, 85% of global GDP and over 75% of global trade. Yet 
the G20 has been only minimally institutionalised, with an annually rotating 
presidency and agenda, and no common staffing for purposes of continuity 
or linking up on a regular basis with other global or regional institutions. 
A just-security approach would involve transforming the G20 into what 
might be called the ‘G20+’ (where the plus signifies new linkages, supported 
by a modest and possibly virtual secretariat) and strengthening its level of 
institutional coordination with the United Nations (including the General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council), the World Bank, IMF, 
ILO, World Trade Organisation and regional organisations. In brief, a G20+ 
would promote integrated economic, social and environmental approaches 
to international problems and, in so doing, would build upon the G20’s 
current interactions with civil society and the business community, as well 
as regional and sub-regional organisations, especially from regions under-
represented in the G20 itself: Central America, Andean South America, 
Africa, Southwest and Central Asia, and much of Southeast Asia.22
Secondly, the G20+ would lend support to, and introduce financial and 
other incentives for, countries and regions that sustain financial and eco-
nomic regulatory reform and renewal, while reducing economic nationalism. 
In support of these aims, it would promote transparency for all economic 
and financial actors and activities, as well as appropriate regulation and 
supervision. Finally, the G20+ would better respond to cross-border eco-
nomic crises by leveraging far closer ties to the UN to enhance coordination 
(including technical and financial resources) between UN member states, 
global economic bodies, and regional and other development banks, includ-
ing, as they gain experience, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and 
the BRICS Development Bank.
To ensure greater institutionalised coordination between the G20+ coun-
tries, the 193 UN member states, and representatives of major global and 
regional economic bodies, the G20+ should meet at the heads-of-state level 
every two years at UN headquarters. In alternate years, the G20+ would 
continue to meet in the country of a particular year’s rotating president. 
Whereas the chief policy focus of the G20+ should remain priority-setting 
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on critical issues for the world economy, including in the area of crisis 
response, it should depend on formal international organisations and states 
for implementation and follow-through. To support the periodic meetings 
in New York and basic levels of coordination and exchange among the sec-
retariats of global economic bodies, a light global economic-cooperation 
liaison mechanism should be created, involving senior staff from the G20+, 
the UN, and other major global and regional economic bodies. The just-
security logic in this proposal holds that the G20+ could and should focus 
on financial stabilisation and crisis avoidance, while working with its part-
ners and through co-memberships to develop policies and strategies that 
aim to reduce economic inequality and build job opportunities. In turn, the 
broader aim would be to reverse the troubling global trend of decreasing 
confidence in governments. 
Climate change and human livelihoods
The global climate is a priori beyond the reach of any single state to manage. 
There is no chance of a single state providing either justice (who pays?) or 
security (who suffers the consequences?) regarding climate change. Even if 
states were willing to act together, as the latest reporting from the science 
working group of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) argues is imperative,23 certain global processes seem already to have 
been set in motion that human action can no longer stop – such as the per-
sistence of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere or the rising temperature and 
acidification of the open oceans. Dealing effectively with climate change 
may well require new understandings of what constitutes security, justice 
and governance in the twenty-first century.
Today we understand that collective human impact has become stronger 
as economies and populations have grown, and that it has global conse-
quence. Current and projected human action is exerting a powerful influence 
on many planetary systems, including the atmosphere, oceans, fresh water 
and others. Each system has what scientists call ‘planetary boundaries’, safe 
operating conditions beyond which they may become unpredictable and 
even change state. Rebalancing their flows abruptly can have severely detri-
mental effects for humankind.24 
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Since the inaugural IPCC report in 1990, periodic updates have contin-
ued to deepen the scientific consensus around the nature, causes and effects 
of a changing global climate. In the IPCC’s most recent assessment report, 
its fifth, the findings are most dramatic. Greenhouse-gas (GHG) levels are 
the highest they have been in more than 800,000 years, and rates of increase 
are the highest in 22,000. Global temperatures are predicted to rise more 
than 2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100 unless global GHG emissions 
are pushed 40–70% lower by 2050 than they were in 2010, and fall to zero 
by 2100.25
Still, global institutions must do what they can to promote the mitiga-
tion of, as well as safe and effective adaptation to, climate change. Such 
efforts include energy re-sourcing and conserva-
tion, and plans to deal with larger storms, deeper 
droughts, higher seas and attendant population dis-
placements. Much is known and agreed about the 
science of climate change, its drivers and its likely 
regional variations. Much less is known or agreed 
about how to promote mitigation and adaptation 
on a broad enough scale as to make either approach effective yet afford-
able. Present global political institutions were designed neither to avoid nor 
to adapt their members’ respective societies or economies to the effects of 
global climate change, with serious consequences for global security and 
justice if business-as-usual approaches prevail. Indeed, current worst-case 
models, which assume not only minimum mitigation but maximum contin-
ued exploitation of fossil fuels, posit what amounts to runaway greenhouse 
warming from mid-century onward. 
Geoengineering (also called climate engineering) is a drastic yet appeal-
ing option to face these threats.26 It refers to strategies that try to alter the 
climate system through direct human intervention, broadly divided into 
two categories: removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and modi-
fying the reflective properties of the atmosphere. Although the science of 
geoengineering is mentioned in the most recent IPCC assessment report, 
little mention is made of governance aspects or the global justice and secu-
rity implications it carries with it. Currently, no international treaties govern 
Geoengineering 
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geoengineering, and no international organisation has offered policy guid-
ance. Still, national scientific bodies have begun to consider its applications 
and implications, and the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies has 
even suggested a code of conduct.
Carbon-dioxide removal, or carbon sequestration, is the better under-
stood of the two approaches. It aims to remove CO2 from the atmosphere 
and store it either by trapping it in the oceans through chemical reactions or 
in natural sinks underground. The most basic sequestration techniques are 
widely considered safe for experimentation and limited implementation. 
Modifying the reflective properties of the atmosphere – also called albedo 
modification or solar-radiation management (SRM) – is the more controver-
sial approach. It seeks to increase the atmosphere’s reflective properties by 
dispersing aerosols, or through cloud-seeding or brightening techniques, for 
example, to keep a larger fraction of the sun’s heat from reaching the lower 
atmosphere, lowering global temperatures if done on a large enough scale. 
Unlike storing excess carbon, however, these techniques can fundamentally 
alter other important climate dynamics, such as regional precipitation pat-
terns, and they do not alter GHG concentrations or their contributions to 
ocean acidification. 
SRM strategies are likely to have unforeseen trans-boundary impacts, 
would pose a host of governance challenges and ethical concerns, and do 
not address the root causes of carbon pollution. Any SRM experimenta-
tion should, therefore, be undertaken with the greatest caution. In 2011, 160 
civil-society organisations and other non-governmental actors lobbied the 
IPCC not to promote geoengineering, fearing that it would overshadow 
broader climate-mitigation efforts and divert funds that might otherwise be 
used for climate adaptation. Indeed, some forms of geoengineering may be 
a growing risk to orderly climate-change management because they appear 
temptingly inexpensive, and there is no framework in place to prevent 
unwise experimentation, even on a fairly large scale. 
Climate-engineering experiments should be subject to careful scrutiny, 
especially those involving solar-radiation or albedo-management tech-
niques. All such experiments should be subject to review and approval 
by an expert advisory board attached to a new climate-research registry. 
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Furthermore, UN member states should agree to treat its decisions as 
binding, in the common interest; an appeals board would also be desirable. 
All atmospheric research involving solar-radiation management should be 
considered human-subject experimentation insofar as its intent is to affect the 
living conditions of people and, even if conducted over uninhabited places, 
experimental effects could carry into populated areas. Approval should 
be conditioned on best available evidence and modelling indicating that 
expected trans-boundary effects are minimal. Experiments with purposeful 
trans-boundary impacts, where scientifically warranted, should also require 
the formal approval of the nations affected. Carbon-sequestration technolo-
gies could have a different threshold of action triggering oversight from the 
proposed advisory board because the effects of smaller experiments could 
be quite localised. Larger experiments, or those involving direct extraction 
of CO2 from the atmosphere, should be presented to the advisory board, 
and a future climate-research registry should have a special track for record-
ing all approved climate-engineering projects.
Climate change is a threat to the human security of hundreds of millions 
of people and their livelihoods. Drastic solutions such as geoengineering are 
not only scientific challenges, but also require our most advanced thinking 
in terms of governance of their justice and security implications on a plan-
etary scale.
* * *
A short-lived aerial bombing campaign or a handful of military advisers may 
contribute to the protection of civilians for a while, but they will not bring 
about viable and accountable institutions which have the trust of the people 
and lead them durably out of a cycle of conflict. Financial stability in our 
hyperconnected global economy may be maintained by a club of powerful 
countries, but their detachment from the wider global architecture under-
mines their legitimacy. Global connectivity amplifies, rather than glosses 
over, inequalities and inequities. Climate change multiplies threats and 
hardships as countries continue to debate what an equitable response may 
look like. Some may be tempted to use geoengineering to generate quick, if 
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temporary, respite from the immediate effects of atmospheric warming, but 
such attempts come with the risk of large-scale experiments going awry, or 
succeeding but ending abruptly, with potentially devastating consequences 
for justice and security alike. 
What all three examples show is the need for effective transnational 
governance mechanisms and approaches, which take due account of the 
security and justice implications of the policies and actions of both govern-
ments and non-state actors. Pursuing security and justice jointly in global 
governance is vital to human progress in the twenty-first century. 
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